Parfit on Moral Disagreement and The Analogy Between Morality and Mathematics by Greif, Adam
688  
 
              
DOI: https://doi.org/10.31577/filozofia.2021.76.9.4   
PARFIT ON MORAL DISAGREEMENT AND THE ANALOGY 
BETWEEN MORALITY AND MATHEMATICS 
ADAM GREIF, Univerzita Komenského v Bratislave, Filozofická fakulta, Katedra filozofie a de-
jín filozofie, Bratislava, SR  
GREIF, A.: Parfit on Moral Disagreement and The Analogy Between Morality 
and Mathematics 
FILOZOFIA, 76, 2021, No 9, pp. 688 – 703 
In his book On What Matters, Derek Parfit defends a version of moral non-natu-
ralism, a view according to which there are objective normative truths, some of 
which are moral truths, and we have a reliable way of discovering them. These 
moral truths do not exist, however, as parts of the natural universe nor in Plato’s 
heaven. While explaining in what way these truths exist and how we discover 
them, Parfit makes analogies between morality on the one hand, and mathematics 
and logic on the other. Moral truths “exist” in a way that numbers exist, and we 
discover these truths in a similar way as we discover truths about numbers. By the 
end of the second volume, Parfit also responds to a powerful objection against his 
view, an objection based on the phenomenon of moral disagreement. If people 
widely and deeply disagree about what’s the moral truth, it is doubtful whether we 
have a reliable way of discovering it. In his reply, he claims that in ideal conditions 
for thinking about moral questions, we would all have sufficiently similar moral 
beliefs. But we often find ourselves in less-than-ideal conditions due to various 
factors that distort our ability to agree. Therefore, differences in moral opinion can 
be expected. In this paper, I draw a connection between these parts of Parfit’s the-
ory and comment on them. Firstly, I argue that Parfit’s analogy with mathematics 
and logic and his answer to the disagreement objection are in tension because there 
are important epistemic differences between morality and these fields. If one 
would try to account for the differences, one would have to sacrifice some measure 
of similarity between morality and them. Secondly, I comment on Parfit’s reply to 
the disagreement objection itself. I believe that, although his description of ideal 
conditions has some potential for reaching moral agreement, it may be difficult to 
tell if ideal conditions prevail. This obscurity spells further trouble for Parfit’s 
overall theory. 
Keywords: Moral disagreement – Moral truth – Mathematics – Similarity – Com-
panions in guilt – Agreement distorting factors – Non-naturalism  
Introduction 
In his book On What Matters, Derek Parfit defends a version of moral non-naturalism, 
a view according to which there are objective normative truths, some of which are 
moral truths, and we have a reliable way of discovering them. These moral truths do 
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not exist, however, as parts of the natural universe nor in Plato’s heaven. While ex-
plaining in what way these truths exist and how we discover them, Parfit makes ana-
logies between morality on the one hand, and mathematics and logic on the other. 
Moral truths “exist” in a way that numbers exist, and we discover these truths in a sim-
ilar way as we discover truths about numbers. By the end of the second volume, Parfit 
also responds to a powerful objection against his view, an objection based on the phe-
nomenon of moral disagreement. If people widely and deeply disagree about what’s 
the moral truth, it is doubtful whether we have a reliable way of discovering it. In his 
reply, he claims that in ideal conditions for thinking about moral questions, we would 
all have sufficiently similar moral beliefs. But we often find ourselves in less-than-
ideal conditions due to various factors that distort our ability to agree. Therefore, dif-
ferences in moral opinion can be expected. In this paper, I draw a connection between 
these parts of Parfit’s theory and comment on them. Firstly, I argue that Parfit’s anal-
ogy with mathematics and logic and his answer to the disagreement objection are in 
tension because there are important epistemic differences between morality and these 
fields. If one would try to account for the differences, one would have to sacrifice 
some measure of similarity between morality and them. Secondly, I comment on Par-
fit’s reply to the disagreement objection itself. I believe that, although his description 
of ideal conditions has some potential for reaching moral agreement, it may be diffi-
cult to tell if ideal conditions prevail. This obscurity spells further trouble for Parfit’s 
overall theory. 
I use the concept of moral truth frequently in this paper, so I start by putting forth 
some of Parfit’s moral truths in order to make the concept more tangible. A longer 
interpretative section follows in which I first explain in what ways is morality analo-
gous to mathematics and logic according to Parfit, and then describe his reply to the 
disagreement objection. Next, I’ll present a short argument stating that claims of ana-
logy between morality on the one hand, and mathematics and logic on the other, are 
part of an implicit companions-in-guilt strategy. Therefore, they are key to the justifi-
cation of Parfit’s overall theory. In the second and critical section of the text, I first 
point out the tension I see between the claims of analogy and Parfit’s reply to the 
disagreement objection, and then proceed to criticize the reply itself. 
I start with some of Parfit’s examples of objective moral truth. In the first volume 
of his book, Parfit asks rhetorically: “Who could possibly deny that the nature of agony 
gives us reasons to want to avoid being in agony, and that the nature of happiness 
gives us reasons to want to be happy?” (Parfit 2011a, 57) Or to put it positively and 
simply: 
A Suffering is bad. 
B Happiness is good. 
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Claims A and B are supposed to be objective moral truths in the following sense: 
Parfit’s favoured conception of normativity is reason-involving (Parfit 2011b, 268). 
The concepts of good and bad are normative in the sense that the fact that X is good 
gives us reasons to want X, and the fact that Y is bad gives us reasons to avoid Y. 
Claims A and B are objective in the sense that the reasons to avoid suffering and to 
want to be happy are not given by our desires, attitudes, or decisions, but are given by 
the objects themselves – in case of A and B, by suffering and happiness. 
It is not clear in what sense are A and B objective moral truths. Parfit does not 
shy away from talking about “normative facts”, which suggests that A and B are true 
in the sense that they correspond to moral facts or correctly describe moral reality. 
But he claims that normative (and moral) truths, as well as mathematical and logical 
truths, are not true in virtue of corresponding to facts or describing reality correctly 
(Parfit 2017, 60). In what sense, positively, are they true, remains unclear to me. 
(Much less than what a “fact” means here, given that there’s no moral reality to speak 
of.) Perhaps Parfit would claim that the concept of truth (and fact) is primitive, and 
therefore its sense cannot be explicated. 
Parfit’s claims of analogy between morality and mathematics  
Now I turn to the claims of analogy between morality, mathematics and logic. In the 
first instance, morality is epistemologically analogous to mathematics and logic. In 
Parfit’s view, moral, mathematical, and logical knowledge is non-empirical. We dis-
cover moral truths like A and B in “something like the way in which” we discover 
mathematical and logical truths – that is, “merely by thinking about them” or via the 
“intuitive ability." (Parfit 2011b, 488-489). 
For example, if we have a sentence like “17 x 3 = 51”, we think about its content 
and recognize, via reason, that it is true. Similarly, we recognize via reason that both 
P and not-P cannot be true, or that if P is true and if P, then Q is also true, then Q must 
be true. The same process ought to apply to A and B. Simply by thinking about suf-
fering we recognize that it is bad, and simply by thinking about happiness we recog-
nize that it is good. These and other moral truths are supposed to be necessary and 
self-evident, although not infallible. They are self-evident but not infallible in the 
sense that A, B, or some other moral judgement could seem obvious to us, but none-
theless we could still be mistaken about it. 
However, making morality epistemologically analogous to mathematics and 
logic comes with a problem. For any view that treats a class of truths and facts as if 
they were not part of this universe faces a traditional epistemological challenge. If 
these truths are not part of this universe, then they are not concrete, spatio-temporal 
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objects, and they are not causally efficacious. The challenge then is to explain how 
we, concrete, spatio-temporal objects, can have epistemic access to these truths. 
The epistemological similarity between morality and mathematics and logic is 
retained in Parfit’s reply to this causal objection. Although moral, mathematical, and 
logical truths are not causally efficacious, we are able to “respond” to reasons to be-
lieve in these truths “non-causally”. Parfit explains that when we are aware of some 
moral fact, like that suffering is bad, this awareness gives us reason to avoid suffering, 
which in turn can prompt us to avoid it. Correspondingly, our awareness of a valid 
argument with true premises gives us a decisive reason to believe in its conclusion, 
which in turn can lead us to believe in its conclusion (Parfit 2011b, 493, 500, 502). 
The second claim of analogy concerns ontology. Morality is ontologically anal-
ogous to mathematics and logic. I already touched on this kind similarity in my com-
ment on Parfit’s concept of moral truth. Moral truths, numbers, the property of valid-
ity, and similar entities are not natural entities, nor are they denizens of Plato’s heaven. 
Parfit writes that “there are” moral truths, numbers, the property of validity, and such, 
but they “do not exist in an ontological sense” and have “no ontological status” (Parfit 
2011b, 481). This need not concern us because, as we can see in the case of mathe-
matics, we do not have to determine if numbers exist or in what sense they exist in 
order to successfully do mathematics (Parfit 2011b, 480). 
These claims raise several questions and could seem baffling. However, I will 
leave  their interpretation and evaluation to others, as my interest lies elsewhere. I do 
want to argue here, however, that the claims of analogy between morality on the one 
hand, and mathematics and logic on the other, are vitally important for Parfit’s overall 
theory. Imagine that morality was the only area of enquiry with the aforementioned 
epistemological and ontological profile. The only non-empirical objective knowledge 
we would know of is moral knowledge. Only moral truths would be such that, alt-
hough we could say that there are these truths, they nonetheless don’t exist as part of 
this universe nor as part of any other kind of reality. Such a view about morality would 
face traditional epistemological and ontological attacks and would be much less plau-
sible if we could not point to other respectable disciplines with similar profile. Hence, 
the point of the claims of analogy is to add plausibility to the overall metaethical theory.  
Claims of analogy between morality and mathematics are not new and a view on 
close relation between mathematical and moral knowledge goes back to Plato (Cowie 
and Rowland 2020, 4-5; Burnyeat 2000, 8). They are also important because they 
could be used as part of a defensive strategy against arguments in favour of moral 
anti-realism.1 Cowie’s and Rowland’s elucidation of the strategy, known as 
 
1 I classify non-cognitivism, moral relativism, subjectivism, moral skepticism, and error theory as 
versions of (robust) anti-realism. 
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companions-in-guilt, is, in my view, the most useful. In their view, the strategy at-
tempts to show that arguments in favour of anti-realism over-generalise in the sense 
that “if they were sound, they would also undermine the credentials of some non-
moral domain of thought or enquiry.” (Cowie and Rowland 2020, 1) If Parfit’s claims 
of analogy were accepted, then competing arguments could implausibly over-gener-
alise to mathematics. Schematically: 
(A) If moral anti-realism is true, then mathematical anti-realism is true. 
(B) Mathematical anti-realism is not true. 
(C) Therefore, moral anti-realism is not true. 
Where (A) is justified by the claims of analogy and (B) accepted by assumption. 
Therefore, without claims of analogy, the justification for Parfit’s overall theory 
would suffer. In the section following the next, I attempt to show that they are difficult 
to maintain. 
Parfit’s response to the argument from moral disagreement  
Now I move to the objection from disagreement, as Parfit formulates it, starting with 
a remark about sense perception. Skeptic notwithstanding, perception is a reliable way 
of knowing the world around us. Most people, most of the time, agree on what they 
see and hear, etc. We agree on perceptual matters unless, of course, there are unfa-
vourable conditions for perception. We might disagree about what we see if, for ex-
ample, we are in an altered state of mind or in a differently lit environment. But we 
would expect that, given that sense perception is a reliable way of knowing the exter-
nal world, in good conditions for perception, virtually everybody would have the same 
perceptual beliefs. 
In Parfit’s view, we have a reliable way of knowing moral truths: our intuitive 
ability. We notice, however, that unlike perception, the use of our intuitive ability 
results in widespread and possibly deep moral disagreement on many issues. How 
could this be? Perhaps the substantial disagreement arises due to unfavourable condi-
tions for intuitive ability. If we truly have a reliable way of discovering moral truths, 
we should expect that in ideal conditions for intuitive ability, virtually everybody 
would have the same moral beliefs. 
Some have denied this and claimed that even in ideal conditions, we would still 
widely differ in our moral beliefs. In such a situation, we would have to think that 
only we can discover moral truths, as opposed to everybody else. Thus, it would 
hardly be rational for us to believe that only we can discover moral truth or that there 
is any. For the most part, this is Parfit’s version of the disagreement objection and an 
outline of his reply. 
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Parfit attempts to show both that the perceived moral disagreement may not be 
as severe as some believe and that we can hope that in the future, in better or ideal 
conditions, there would be widespread moral agreement (Parfit 2011b, 552). How-
ever, we are not in ideal conditions due to various factors that distort our intuitive 
ability and our ability to morally agree. So, let us now look at these distorting factors 
in greater detail. 
First factor: 
1. We morally disagree because we disagree about non-moral matters, natural 
or supernatural. 
For example, we may disagree about whether it is right to legalize cannabis. But 
this disagreement can be based on our differing (empirical) beliefs concerning the 
health effects of cannabis, the consequences of its prohibition and legalization, etc. If 
we agreed on these empirical matters, we might agree on the proper legal status of 
cannabis. 
Also, we may disagree about whether we ought to obey God’s commands. But 
this disagreement can be based on conflicting beliefs concerning God’s existence. If 
all of us believed in an all-good, all-knowing, and all-powerful God, then, Parfit be-
lieves, we would agree that we ought to obey him. 
Second: 
2. We morally disagree because we are self-interested and have egos. 
Self-interest can often taint our moral beliefs. For example, “[i]f we ask how 
much of their income the world’s rich people ought to give to those who are poor, our 
answer may depend on whether we are rich or poor” (Parfit 2011b, 533). But such 
facts about us, our wealth, race, sexual orientation, etc., are not, Parfit believes, mor-
ally relevant. Thus, if we considered the matter blind to these kinds of facts about us, 
we would agree on how much of their income the rich ought to give to the poor. 
Also, “[m]any disagreements cannot be ended, for example, because some peo-
ple become committed to their beliefs, and are unwilling to admit that they have been 
mistaken” (Parfit 2011b, 533). We can differentiate this factor from self-interest and 
call it simply the ego. 
For instance, if I have defended the moral permissibility of euthanasia in the past, 
but now think that I may have been mistaken, it may be too hard for me to admit my 
mistake. Not just because I would have to admit a mistake, but also because I would 
have to admit a grave mistake. If euthanasia is in fact impermissible, it might be true 
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that I have defended murder. Therefore, with regard to moral questions, a lot tends to 
be at stake, so moral mistakes tend to be big and admitting them can be extra hard. 
Third: 
3. We morally disagree because we think moral truth must be precise. 
According to Parfit, comparisons of value are very often imprecise. When we 
compare the quality of two lives, the outcomes of two acts, etc., it is possible that it 
cannot be precisely said which of the two is better, much like it cannot be precisely 
said which of two rooms is more untidy, or which of two theories is more complicated. 
For example, I may be unable to choose which of two career paths, A and B, is 
better for me. Therefore, we judge that A and B are equally good for me. But I may 
be unable to choose between A and B even after learning later that B has some added 
perks, like that it is better paid than I previously thought. If A and B would be precisely 
equally good, then, after learning that B is better paid than I had though, I should see 
that B is better. But this need not be the case. I can remain indecisive even after learn-
ing that B is better paid. Therefore, A and B are imprecisely equally good. In such 
cases, we can maintain both that (i) neither A nor B is better, and that (ii) A and B are 
not precisely equally good. Someone can claim that A is better than B and someone 
else can deny it, because they both mistakenly presuppose that such comparisons can 
be precise. 
Since comparisons of value are very often like this, we should avoid expressing 
them in terms of numbers, ranges of numbers, positions on a line, or as a scale of 
value. Numbers, ranges, positions on lines, and scales of value imply precision and 
are therefore misleading. 
Fourth: 
4. We morally disagree because we think all moral questions have answers. 
Parfit thinks some moral questions simply don’t have answers. He suggests that 
questions regarding early abortion and some questions about war and population eth-
ics might be like this. In the case of early abortion, it can both be true that (i) early 
abortion is not right, and (ii) early abortion is not wrong (I simplify here). Early abor-
tion can be morally undetermined as a matter of fact. People may then disagree about 
the moral status of early abortion and other acts because they mistakenly presuppose 
that their moral status is determined. 
Fifth: 
5. We can morally disagree when we consider borderline cases. 
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Some moral questions are about borderline cases. Here, again, Parfit mentions 
abortion. We may agree that it is wrong to kill innocent human beings but disagree about 
which entities are human beings. Is a human embryo or a foetus a human being? It is hard 
to say which concept to apply. In such cases, it is understandable that people disagree. 
I am going to mention the remaining four distorting factors only briefly, since 
they are not as important for my critique. (6) Some moral questions do not have either-
or answers, but more-or-less answers. Rightness and wrongness can be a matter of 
degree. If people presume that rightness and wrongness cannot be a matter of degree, 
they can artificially differ. (7) Sometimes people adhere to the same moral principles 
but apply them differently because they are in different conditions. Their moral disa-
greement is only apparent but not real. (8) Other times people equivocate on “right”, 
“wrong”, and other moral terms. If they used these terms in the same sense, they might 
not disagree. (9) And lastly, when people adhere to different moral theories, they dis-
agree about why certain acts are wrong, but might not disagree about which acts are 
wrong. The former kind of disagreement is not fundamental and can be expected. 
A critique of analogy between morality and mathematics 
So far, I have mostly presented Parfit’s claims and arguments. In the remainder of this 
paper, I will turn to my commentary and critique of them. 
My first comment relates to the analogy claims between morality on the one 
hand, and mathematics and logic on the other. The claims of analogy are true only if 
a certain conception of mathematics and logic is true. Namely one according to which 
mathematical and logical truths are non-natural, non-normative, objective, without 
ontological implications, and which we access via our intuitive ability that is different 
from perception. But the question of what’s the correct conception of mathematics 
and logic is not settled in the philosophy of mathematics and logic, as evidenced by 
the fact that, in a survey of professional philosophers and with regard to the philoso-
phy of abstract objects, about 39 % are Platonists, about 37 % nominalists, and 23 % 
hold some other view (Bourget and Chalmers 2014, 478). Furthermore, Parfit does 
not deal with alternative theories. The analogies hold only if Parfit’s conception of 
mathematics and logic happens to be true. Otherwise, morality has no companions. 
For the sake of argument, let’s assume that Parfit’s conception of mathematics 
and logic is correct. The overall problem I see with a defence of objective moral truth 
based on mathematics and logic is that it can focus only on similarities and ignore 
differences. Traditionally, the indispensability of mathematics in science has been 
perceived as a main disanalogy between mathematics and morality. According to 
Quine-Putnam indispensability argument, some of our best theories that explain ob-
servations refer to mathematical objects. These objects are therefore explanatorily 
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indispensable and we ought to add them to our ontology (Putnam 2010, 57). This 
seems not to be the case in ethics. As Harman argued, “[i]n explaining the observa-
tions that support a physical theory, scientists typically appeal to mathematical prin-
ciples. On the other hand, one never seems to need to appeal in this way to moral 
principles” (Harman 1977, 10). 
I do not wish to defend nor reject this difference between morality and mathe-
matics. The claim I want to make is that in Parfit’s theory, there is a tension between 
the claims of analogy and his answer to the disagreement objection because of some 
other difference. We could claim that just like there is  non-empirical, objective math-
ematical and logical truth, there is non-empirical, objective moral truth, and all are 
accessed simply by thinking. But if these claims are informative or substantial, we 
ought to be able to draw some implications from them. Firstly, if we discover moral 
truths in a similar way in which we discover mathematical and logical truths, then we 
should expect that our ability to resolve moral and mathematical disputes be similar, 
and that the extent of (dis)agreement on moral matters compared to that of mathemat-
ics and logic be similar as well. This, I think, is not the case. 
Admittedly, it is hard to compare different areas of enquiry in terms of how much 
we agree in them. Perhaps, as Parfit might say, such comparisons can only be impre-
cise. Nonetheless, I assume that such comparisons are not impossible. For who would 
deny that morality is substantially different from mathematics and logic with regard 
to our ability to reach agreement? After all, when we want to give example of an area 
of enquiry in which agreement is normal and to be expected, at least in time, we bring 
up mathematics or logic. And when we want to give example of an area of enquiry in 
which disagreement is normal and to be expected, we bring up ethics (or politics, 
which is arguably closely related to ethics). The difference in ability to agree and re-
solve disputes then translates into difference in similarity of beliefs. We share many 
more mathematical beliefs than we share moral beliefs. This, I think, is the clearest 
disanalogy between morality on the one hand, and mathematics and logic on the other.  
Clarke-Doane argues that, although many more people disagree about moral 
propositions than about mathematical ones, the disagreement is not epistemically sig-
nificant (2020, 49 – 55). Firstly, this is consistent with my criticism of Parfit that if 
ethics and mathematics are ontologically and epistemologically similar, then we 
should expect, but do not observe, similar extent of agreement. And secondly, Clarke-
Doane argues for the claim that mathematics has no better claim to a priori justifica-
tion by pointing out the extent of disagreement or agnosticism among mathematicians 
with regard to truth or falsity of mathematical axioms (2020, 50 – 51). This is con-
sistent with the empirical claim that there is higher proportion of disagreement or ag-
nosticism among (professional) ethicists. Admittedly, one could object that I overly 
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stress the extent of disagreement in ethics and downplay it in mathematics. But this is 
an empirical question in the end. Before we have good empirical evidence supporting 
one answer or another, I think it is better to stick with what seems plausible. And it 
does not seem plausible that professionals in mathematics disagree just as much pro-
fessionals in ethics do.  
Some would reject the claim that mathematics and logic are paradigms of agree-
ment for a different reason. These people might refer to the deep disagreements re-
garding the fundamental or philosophical questions of mathematics and logic. From 
this point of view, mathematics and logic do not seem like paradigms of agreement. 
However, even if there are deep disagreements on the fundamental level of mathe-
matics and logic, there are also deep disagreements concerning the fundamental ques-
tions of morality, whether they are metaethical or about the first principles of norma-
tive ethics. The disagreements in morality are not confined to the fundamental level 
but pertain to the non-fundamental level of judgements about particular cases as well. 
We not only disagree on whether there is a moral reality or what is the supreme moral 
principle of action, we also disagree, for example, whether hereditary gene editing, 
donating 10 % of one’s income to an effective charity, abortion, euthanasia, and many 
other acts are moral. 
Moreover, in context of Parfit’s non-naturalism, this reply is problematic for an-
other reason as well. As I said earlier, Parfit assumes certain conception of mathematics 
and logic in order to posit companions for morality. Stressing the controversial nature 
of debates concerning the philosophy of mathematics does not serve well his assumption. 
The extent of disagreement is the first difference between morality and mathe-
matics and logic. The second one relates to factors that distort agreement. By postu-
lating various factors that distort our intuitive ability and our ability to reach moral 
agreement, Parfit attempts to explain why there is as much moral disagreement as 
there is. But here’s the second implication. If we access moral truth in a similar way 
in which we access mathematical and logical truth, then should we not expect that 
similar distorting factors apply to both? For when it comes to distorting factors, mo-
rality differs from mathematics and logic. 
Consider (1), the factor of differing beliefs about the natural and supernatural. It 
does not apply to mathematics and logic. Our beliefs about the natural and supernat-
ural world are largely irrelevant to our ability to agree in mathematics and logic. There 
isn’t much that I can add here. Perhaps only that the fact that natural and supernatural 
beliefs are largely irrelevant to mathematical and logical thinking is one reason to 
think that mathematical and logical truths are non-empirical. Since our moral beliefs 
are sensitive to our natural and supernatural beliefs, it gives us a reason to think that 
moral truths are not non-empirical, contrary to what Parfit believed. 
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Consider (2), the influence of self-interest and ego on our moral beliefs. Facts about 
us and our position in the world, like the fact that we are rich or poor, are irrelevant to 
our ability to agree in mathematics and logic. There are no mathematical views affili-
ated with either the rich or the poor. 
I suppose the same thing exactly could not be said about the ego factor. We may 
be generally unwilling to accept a piece of new information that contradicts our be-
liefs. I presume this applies to mathematical and logical beliefs as well; but I still think 
that there is a difference. 
Let’s say that I don’t like a particular mathematical conjecture, maybe because 
I have ridiculed its author in the past or because it contradicts what I believe about 
mathematics. But now let’s say that I find out there’s proof of it. If the proof is correct 
and I am able to understand it, then, no matter how much I don’t like its conclusion, 
I will, perhaps grudgingly, accept it. Mathematical and logical arguments can have 
this kind of leverage or exhibit us to this kind of forcing. I am not saying that no moral 
argument can have such a leverage or forcing, but it seems to me that the phenomenon 
of accepting an uncomfortable conclusion under force of reason is less common in 
ethics than in mathematics and logic. If this is true, then the distorting influence (2) is 
not very applicable to mathematics and logic. 
Clarke-Doane suggests that it is questionable that mathematics generates conver-
gence in mathematical beliefs and that we have a reliable method of resolving math-
ematical disputes. Moral claims, in his view, admit of proof in the same way that 
mathematical claims do, which is by logically following from the chosen set of axioms 
(Clarke-Doane 2020, 3 – 4, 37 – 40). This is a reason to think that our abilities to reach 
moral and mathematical agreement are on a par.  
However, mathematical terms, in contrast to moral terms, tend to be more pre-
cisely defined (implicitly in axioms or explicitly). It is the precision of definitions of 
mathematical terms that in part allows us to use them and to deduce theorems. But in 
moral dispute, definitions of key moral terms are usually part of the problem.2 While 
we may agree on what precisely a point, a line, or a complex number is, we tend to 
disagree about what freedom, justice, or welfare is. Hence, due to ambiguity of moral 
terms, we may have problems formulating moral axioms precise enough to deduce 
theorems and to agree on the correct interpretations of both. This may be one of the 
reasons why, as I have claimed, moral proofs tend to lack leverage or forcing.  
And finally (3), the imprecision of moral truths. In Parfit’s view, comparisons of 
value are very often imprecise, and we should avoid expressing them in terms of num-
bers, ranges of numbers, positions on lines, or as scales of value. Moral matters are 
 
2 I thank Róbert Maco and his Mathematical Propositions as Rules (2019; 2020) for this insight. 
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rarely precise and exact. But this again contrasts with mathematics and logic, as pre-
cision and exactness are their characteristic features. 
These dissimilarities suggest either that morality is not epistemologically and 
ontologically analogous to mathematics and logic, or, if the analogy is maintained, 
that distorting factors (1), (2), and (3) are not genuine factors and should not be used 
to explain away moral disagreements. In the latter case, Parfit’s reply to the disagree-
ment objection is weakened, as it cannot utilize these distorting factors. 
One could reply by saying that there still remain six distorting factors that can 
explain away our moral disagreements. But I don’t think they can help. 
The challenge can be summed up like this. If morality is both epistemologically 
and ontologically analogous to mathematics and logic, then why is there a difference 
in our ability to agree? In an attempt to meet this challenge, we postulate various fac-
tors distorting our ability to reach moral agreement. But then, if a distorting factor 
applies only to morality but not to mathematics and logic, it suggests that morality is 
dissimilar to mathematics and logic. Alternatively, if a distorting factor applies to all: 
morality, mathematics, and logic, then it cannot help us in explaining the difference 
in our ability to reach agreement. 
One could say that a distorting influence applies to all: morality, mathematics, 
and logic, but more to morality and less to mathematics and logic. But then the diffe-
rence in degree again suggests dissimilarity. 
In another reply, one can claim that we cannot draw the implications that I have 
drawn. That is, even if the fields of morality, mathematics, and logic are similar in 
philosophically important ways, we cannot expect that similar distorting factors apply 
to them or that the extent of agreement be similar in them. Similarity does not equal 
sameness; it allows for differences. 
I disagree with this objection and maintain that we can have these expectations. 
If I say that Frank and Mark are similarly big, then I can expect that their shirts and 
shoes will be of similar size because the size of a person is closely linked to the size 
of their shirts and shoes. (Although I cannot expect that their shirts or shoes will be of 
similar colour.) If someone says that morality is, with regard to knowledge and being, 
similar to mathematics and logic, then I can expect that they will be similar with re-
gard to agreement and agreement distorting factors because knowledge and agreement 
are closely linked as well. I believe they are closely linked because we judge a cogni-
tive ability, like perception or mathematical ability, as reliable partly (or mainly) be-
cause, on its basis, we generally agree. 
In still another reply, one could say that it is nonetheless perfectly possible that 
morality is similar to mathematics and logic in some ways (epistemology, ontology) 
but dissimilar in others (extent of agreement and agreement distortion). I do not deny 
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that possibility. It is, however, important to emphasize that it is merely that – a possi-
bility. It is one thing to say that, in effect, because of its similarity, morality has com-
panions in mathematics and logic, and quite another to say that it is possible that mo-
rality has companions in mathematics and logic. 
And finally, one could respond by saying that even when our expectations are 
not met, it doesn’t prove much. After all, according to Parfit, we discover moral truths 
in “something like the way in which” we discover mathematical and logical truths, 
although not the same way. Moreover, morality has different subject matter, which is 
distinct from mathematics and logic. Therefore, some differences are to be expected.3 
Fair enough. I respond by saying that mathematics and logic (if they are sepa-
rate fields) are much more similar to each other than they are to morality. At least 
with regard to epistemology, our ability to agree, and our vulnerability to various 
distorting factors. It seems to me that morality still sticks out. 
A critique of Parfit’s response to moral disagreement 
My second comment relates to Parfit’s response to the disagreement objection, and 
I would like to start here on a positive note. I think Parfit’s distorting factors could 
be very beneficial, as they could potentially provide practical guidance in resolving 
our moral differences and lead to progress in ethics. That is to say that if we disagree 
on an answer to a moral question, we could at least in principle go through the 
checklist of various distorting factors, rule them out one by one, and see if our dis-
agreement persists. Under the presumption that the distorting factors that Parfit de-
scribed are genuine, we should come to an agreement. And that must count for 
something. 
However, it is not clear to me whether such a method is applicable in practice, 
as some distorting factors may be hard to rule out. Let’s say that we give conflicting 
answers to an important moral question, MQ. Perhaps MQ is the question “Is early 
abortion morally permissible?”, or “Is it better for me to live with worsening de-
mentia or undergo assisted suicide?”, or “Is it right to save my own child rather than 
to save two children of a stranger?”, etc. If we disagree about the right answer to 
MQ even after carefully thinking about it, then we should make sure that no dis-
torting factor is in play. To do that, we have to answer some other questions first: 
 
3 When Parfit says that we discover moral truths in “something like the way in which” we discover 
mathematical and logical truths, we can read the passage as suggesting that morality, mathematics 
and logic are accessed via somewhat different cognitive abilities. But Parfit does not postulate any 
difference between these abilities. Positively, what he says about how we form moral, mathematical, 
and logical beliefs is the same. We form all of them “merely by thinking”. 
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i. Does MQ have an answer? 
ii. If MQ does have an answer and it is about comparison of value, can the com-
parison be precise? 
iii. If MQ does have an answer, is it an either-or or a more-or-less kind of an 
answer? 
iv. Is MQ about a borderline case? 
The problem I see here is that answering (i) – (iv) may be just as hard as answer-
ing MQ in the first place, partly because questions (i) – (iv) are fairly abstract and 
partly because it is not clear how we should approach them. 
Answers to questions (i) – (iv) are claims about moral facts. In Parfit’s theory, 
we form beliefs about moral facts via our moral intuitive ability. Therefore, answers 
to questions (i)-(iv) should be either self-evident intuitions, or they should be inferred 
ultimately from such intuitions. But who could say about any of the answers to ques-
tions (i)-(iv) that they are self-evident to them or that they could infer them from self-
evident moral truths? 
The way I read Parfit suggests that answers to these questions are either brute in-
tuitions or that they are inferred from the fact that MQ is a hard question (Parfit 2011b, 
560). The latter is a tempting possibility, but as long as “hard problem” means “one that 
we disagree about”, I do not think it is a promising one. For suppose we judge that MQ 
does not have an answer or that it is about a borderline case because we fail to agree on 
an answer to MQ. In the context of Parfit’s theory, such a reply would be circular. Con-
sider the following kind of reasoning: “We disagree about MQ because distorting factors 
(4) or (5) are in play. How do we know that distorting factors (4) or (5) are in play? 
Because we disagree about MQ.” Since we could reason this way with regard to any 
MQ, genuine moral disagreement could become impossible. 
Another possibility is to infer that MQ has no answer from the fact that when we 
think about MQ, simply no answer comes to mind. But I don’t think we could say that 
about early abortion; some answers clearly come to mind. Maybe there are other MQs 
regarding which no answers come to mind. Parfit mentioned some problems of “ethics 
of population or the morality of war”, but he was not specific, so I will not discuss the 
matter further here (Parfit 2011b, 560). 
The problem of answering questions (i) – (iv) is not just a practical one, but 
a theoretical one as well. Parfit postulates the distorting factors in order to defend the 
so-called convergence claim, which says that in ideal conditions for thinking, we 
would all have pretty much the same moral beliefs. However, we are not in ideal con-
ditions due to several distorting factors. If conditions improve in the future, Parfit 
believes we would see moral convergence. The claim is crucial for a non-naturalist 
like Parfit, since if we would not have the same moral beliefs even in ideal conditions, 
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it would be hard to believe that we have a reliable way of discovering the moral truth 
or that there is any. Therefore, the convergence claim makes or breaks the theory. 
The convergence claim implies that we should expect moral convergence when 
distorting factors are no longer in play. What’s needed then is the ability to recognize 
when distorting factors are no longer in play. If we are unable to say whether a distorting 
factor is in play or not, the convergence claim loses its meaning, as it becomes less clear 
how it could be disproven. Therefore, in attempting to find out if we genuinely disagree 
on an answer to MQ, questions (i) – (iv) and other questions corresponding to the re-
maining distorting factors, would have to be settled first. In effect, we would have to 
converge on the absence of distorting factors in order to find out if we morally converge 
at all. And I am not sure how much hope there is for the first kind of convergence. 
Perhaps I am simply overly skeptical and someone could come up with plausible 
answers to (i) – (iv). But my skepticism has a reason, as even Parfit had some trouble 
determining answers to questions (i) and (iv); that is, the questions of MQ having or 
not having an answer and MQ being or not being a borderline case. He suggests that 
the question about moral status of early abortion has no answer; but in discussing 
borderline cases, he mentions early abortion as an example as well. Arguably, early 
abortion cannot both be morally undetermined and a borderline case. For unless bor-
derline case (5) is the same kind of distorting factor as some moral question not having 
an answer (4), then questions about borderline cases still have answers. So, does the 
question “Is early abortion morally permissible?” have an answer? 
I believe it’s simply hard to tell. Consider the possibility that Parfit thought that 
the moral status of early abortion is undetermined. Then he would disagree about that 
with both sides of the abortion controversy, since virtually everybody who engages in 
the controversy thinks that the moral status of early abortion is determined one way 
or the other. In that case, the situation would be similar to that of facing widespread 
moral disagreement in ideal conditions. It would not be very rational for Parfit to think 
that he, as opposed to almost everybody else, intuited that the status of early abortion 
is undetermined. The remaining possibility is that the question of the moral status of 
early abortion has an answer. But then why would he suggest it as an example of 
a moral question with no answer? 
If it is really as hard to answer questions about the presence of distorting factors 
as I suggested, then it is really hard to actually test the convergence claim and with it 
Parfit’s theory. And the harder it is to test, the less meaningful it is. 
Conclusion 
To sum up, thanks to their a priori appearance, it can seem like moral thinking is similar 
to mathematical and logical thinking. But there are also important differences. One 
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would have to find a way to defend objective moral truth with mathematics and logic 
while at the same time be able to account for the existing epistemic differences between 
them. As for the phenomenon of widespread moral disagreement, one could claim that 
we morally disagree because we are not in ideal conditions for discovering moral truths. 
But it is not very helpful nor theoretically meaningful to postulate ideal conditions 
whose presence or absence is as hard to determine, if not more so, than to resolve the 
initial disagreement. 
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